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LAW AND LANGUAGE IN JAPAN AND 
IN THE UNITED STATES * 
Richard B. Parker料
J apanese civilization has resisted the introduction of Western law. Legal 
institutions based on European models have been in place in J apan for more 
than a century， yet lawyers， and courts， and legal codes in J apan are stil 
curiously peripheral. J apan is impressive as a modern democratic industrial 
nation which seems to do without the constant everyday use of lawyers to 
structure society and to coordinate economic and political activity.l The 
J apanese courts lack the authority of American courts? They have neither 
the will nor the political power to challenge the executive and legislative 
branches of government? Ordinary J apanese citizens regard a resort to law 
to settle private disputes as a general disgrace to al concerned. The 、
antipathy of the J apanese to law has been widely noted. The most com-
mon explanation given for the phenomenon is that Western legal traditions 
conflict with the value that the J apanese place on mutual trust， personal 
* An earlier version of this essay was present巴dto the law faculty seminar at Osaka University. 
1 am grateful to Professors Yoshiharu Matsuura， Shigenori Matsui， Yoshiaki Nomura， Shinya Bamba， 
Hiroshi Matsuoka， Yasumasa Okabe， and especially grateful to Professors Shigeki Tanaka and 
Mitsukuni Yasaki for their insightful criticism. 
* Visiting Professor， Osaka University Faculty of Law. Of Counsel， Goldstein & Manello， 
Boston， Massachusetts. B.A.， 1962， Haverford College; M.A.， Brown University; Ph.D.， 1968， Uni. 
versity of Chicago; J.D.， 1971 Harvard Law School. 
1. To what degr巴eJapan does without !awyers is itseJf a matter of dispute. Although the 
numb巴rof fully trained professiona1 litigators licensed to go to court is very small， law is taught in 
universities as an academic subject and is one of the most popular undergraduate m司ors.People who 
have only an undergraduate law degree staff the law departments of large corporations and govern-
ment ministries; they do much of the work done by lawyers in the United States. Even so， the total 
number of people doing law work is proportionally much les than in the United States. For a brief 
useful description of the structure of the Japanese legal profession， see E. J. Hahn， An Overview o[ the 
Japanese Legal System， 5 NORTHWESTERN JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW & BUSINESS 
517，522・533(1983). 
2. See R. B. Parker， TI包eAuthority o[ Lのvin the United States and in Japan， 33 OSAKA UNI-
VERSITY LAW REVIEW 1 (1986). 
3. See， e.g.， S.Matsui， The Reapportionment Cases In Japan: Constitutional Law， Politics， And 
TI切JapaneseSupreme Court， 33 OSAKA UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW 17 (1986). 
47 
48 OSAKA UNIVERSITY LA W REVIEW [No. 34: 47 
interdependence， and group harmony.4 The view seems to me generally 
correct，5 and 1 try to develop it further in this essay. 
1 . alsosuggest some further very general reasons for the J apanese anti-
pathy to law based on very general features of the place of language in 
J apan. In brief， 1 argue that a necessaηr condition of the exalted place of 
law in America is a peculiarly Western view of language which the Japanese 
do not share. 1 point out how， from the point of view of the Japanese， 
Westerners have reified aspects of language using behavior to give language 
a curiously central importance in Western cultures. Law is primarily a use of 
written language to coordinate and control the behavior of people in society. 
The J apanese have never given langauge the central position it enjoys in the 
West and consequently feel it odd to rely heavily on written language to 
organize society. Furthermore， because of their long isolation during the 
Edo Period， and their cultural homogeneity， the J apanese hav.e means other 
than law to structure their society. This essay will expand on these themes. 
I 
1 said above that， from the point of view of the Japanese， Westerners 
have reified aspects of language using behav.ior to give written language a 
curiously central importance in Western cultures. “Reification" has been 
used by many social philosophers as a technical theoretical term， but 1 wish 
to use the word in this essay in only an expanded version of its ordinary 
dictionary definition. The dictionary definition is，“The mental conversion 
4. See H. Wagatsuma and A. Rosett， Cultural Attitudes Toward Contract Law: Japan and the 
United States Compared， 2 UCLA PACIFIC BASIN LAW JOURNAL 76 (1983) for a clear state-
ment of this view. These authors also review the literature and point out the dearth of empirical 
research on the attitudes of Japanese and Americans toward law. Id. at 78ヴ9.On this point， see also 
W. Gray， The Use and Non-凶eof Contract Law In Japan: A Preliminary Study， 17 LA W IN J APAN 
98 (1984). 
5. Professor J ohn Haley has forcefullyargu巴dthat the access of Japanese citizens to lawyers and 
courts is artificially restricted by consciously chosen policies of limiting the numbers of lawyers and 
judges， suggesting that the Japanese would resort more to law to s巴tledisputes if they could. J. 
Haley， Theめ thof the Reluctant Litigant and the Role of the Judiciary in Japan， 4 JOURNAL 
OF JAPANESE STUDlES 350 (1978). However， ina later classic article， he describes the remarkably 
few powers of enforcement Japanese courts have even when a <.lisp百teis before th巴m，and argues that 
an increas巴inthe minimal enforcement powers of Japanese courts might work major changes in the 
structure of Japanese society. Haley， Sheathing the Sword of Justice in Japan: An Essay on Law 
Without Sanctions， 8:2 JOURNAL OF JAPANESE STUDlES 265 (1982). This suggests that although 
the aversion三tolaw in Japan may be reinforced by a conscious policy at the top to restrict access to 
Iawyers and courts， that policy is itself叩 expressionof the conflict of W，巴sternlegal traditions with 
the value that the Japanese place on mutual trust， personal interdependence， and group harmony. 
1987] LAWAND LANGUAGE IN JAPAN AND IN THE UNITED STATES 49 
of a person or abstract conception into a thing. "6 1 will use “reification" 
and “reify" as fol1ows: 
Reification; noun: The mental process by which an unjustified concreteness， im-
personality， objectivity or independence is attributed to something. 
Reify， verb: To attributean unjustified concreteness， impersonality， objectivity or 
independence to something.7 
The dictionary definition of reification as the mental conversion of an 
abstract concept (or a person) into a thing is thus， on my definition， just one 
type of reification. Another example of a type of reification according to 
my definition might be the betief that some social practice， for example， 
al10wing women to go first through doors， ismore “natural" than the 
contrary practice in which mengo first. In an ordinary， non-technical sense， 
“an unjustified.... objectivity or independence is attributed" to the social 
practice of ladies first. 
The beHef that there exists a human nature shared by al members of our 
species which can serve as a basis of criticism of social practices may itself be 
due to reification. 1 say may be due to reification because neither the 
dictionary definition nor my expanded definition of reification settles any 
argument over whether some particular element in our experience is not 
what it seems， but is only the resu1t of reification. According to my defini柵
tion， reification is an unjustified attribution of concreteness， impersonality， 
objectivity or independence to something. Thus a belief that there really is a 
universal human nature with which social practices are or are not in accord 
may be the resu1t of a reification if， infact， there were no such universal 
human nature， but accepting my general definition of reification does not 
commit one to the position that a particular something (such as human 
nature) is br is not the resu1t of reification.8 
6. OXFORD ENGLlSH DICTIONARY， VOL. VIII (1933). One of thre examples given of a 
use of “reification" is:“1882 J. B. STALLO Concepts & Th. Mod. Physics 269 The existence， or 
posibi1ty， oftranscendental space is another flagrant instance of the reification of concepts." See 
also RANDOM HOUSE DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLlSH LANGUAGE (1983) for the following 
definition:“Reify: to convert into or regard as a concrete thing: to reify an abstract concept." The 
implication of these examples， which 1 make explicit in my definition， is that reification by definition 
involves unjustified belief. 
7. This definition is derived from P. Berger and S. Pulb巴rg，Reiftcation and the Sociological 
Critique of Consciousness 4 HISTORY AND THEORY 196 (1964). In that article，“reification" is 
part of a larger system of technical terms which 1 do not wish to use or to defend in this esay. 
8. 1 make this point in order to distance myself from the arguments over the definition of 
“reification" which are common in philosophical sociology and which are often substantive arguments 
ov'巴rwhich elements in our experience are due to reification. 1 donot wish in this esay to enter these 
arguments. For an introduction to them， se Burke C. Thomason， MAKING SENSE OF REIFICA‘ 
TION: ALFRED SCHUTZ AND CONSTRUCTIONIST THEORY (1982). 
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“Reification" is a useful term because human beings everywhere in al 
cultures seem general1y more likely to make the mistake of reifying rather 
than the opposite mistake of attributing les concreteness， impersonality， 
objectivity and independence to things than can be justified (hereafter， 
“"unde位r値守叩r詑eif匂'yi泊ng"
human beings tend to reify rather t出hanunder-reify because of “吋thefunda-
mental terrors of human existence， notably the teηor of chaos， which is then 
assuaged by the fabrication of the sort of firm order that only reifications 
can constitute."9 Perhaps the firm order provided by reifications also 
provides positive pleasure in addition to freedom from fear. Perhaps it 
has often been to the advantage of powerful groups or individuals in any 
culture to support the reifications current in that culture， although some-
times reifications are invoked by revolutionaries. (“The Rights of Man" or 
“The Proletariat" might be examples.) Whatever the answer to the larger 
question of why people reify， the tendency of human beings everywhere to 
reify rather than under田reifysuggests the value of examining one culture 
from the point of view of another. Things which culture A takes for granted 
but which culture B sees as the results of reification should perhaps be 
examined more c10sely by members of culture A， and vice versa. Things 
which two very different cultures can agree on are less likely to be the 
result of reification， although of course there are no guarantees. Both 
cultures may be reifying in the same way.lO 
From the American point of view， the J apanese seem to reify social roles 
and relationships while， from the Japanese point of view， the Americans 
seem to reify God， morality， law， language， and theory. In what follows， 1 
9. P. Berger and S. Pullberg， supra note 7， at207. 
10. 1 intend no endorsernent of any sort of cultural relativisrn. If two cu1tures disagree on 
whether sornething is the result of a reification， one or the other culture rnay be right， but they cannot 
both be “right relative to their culture." 1 agree with Richard Rorty that this sort of relativisrn is self-
refuting or incoherent. See Rorty， Solidarity or Objectivity? 6 NANZAN REVIEW OF AMERICAN 
STUDlES 1 at 4・5(1984) and Rorty， Pragmatism， Relativism and Irrationalism in CONSEQUENCES 
OF PRAGMATISM 160 at 166-169 (1982). See also Rorty， PHILOSOPHY AND THE MIRROR OF 
NATURE at 257 -311 (1979) for an extended attack on the idea of alternative “conceptual sch巴mes."
1 also agree with Ronald Dworkin in his rejection of wh在the cals “external scepticisrn." Dworkin， 
LAW'S EMPIRE 78-85 (1986). See also Dworkin， A MATTER OF PRINCIPLE 167-177 (1985). 
(Cultural cornparisons can of course be strong argurnents for “internal scepticisrn" and do tend to 
rnake one les trusting of the fundarnental assurnptions of one's own culture and rnore tolerant of 
other cu1tures.) Frorn the point of view of the traditional Western episternologist， Rorty and Dworkin 
both se巴rnto be espousing a naive realisrn. Rorty and， 1 think， Dworkin both deny that they are 
espousmg叩 yespisternology at al. Neither thinks that an espisternology of any sort is likely to be 
useful for his purposes. 1 agree with their argurnents for this view in the works cited above. 
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do not attempt answers to the questions of who is reifying and who is 
not. That would involve me in arguments unnecessary to my purpose here. 
I want only to compare J apanese and American perspectives to suggest some 
general reasons why the Japanese are relatively indifferent to law， and why 
Americans are so drawn to it. 
1 
From the Japanese point of view， Americans tend generally to reify in 
the realm of thought. Description， judgement， and justification by 
Americans of themselves and others according to various psychologica1， 
economic， po1itical， moral， and religious theories play a central role in 
Arnerican life. For Arnericans， freely chosen be1ief in the truth of a religion 
or the truth of a set of political opinions is often constitutive of what one is 
as a person. An Arnerican rnight define herself as a politically conservative 
Rornan Catholic who is a staunch believer in the free rnarket and strongly 
opposed to socialisrn. Another Arnerican rnight define hirnself as a politi-
cally 1iberal Jew who be1ieves strongly in hurnan equality. Regardless of 
their particular re1igious or po1itical beliefs， Americans tend to think that 
having freely chosen opinions on such matters is essential to being a fully 
developed person. A major purpose of American public education is to 
develop the capacity of American children to choose their religious， moral， 
and political beliefs. Americans judge and justify their everyday behavior in 
terms of their religious， moral， and political beliefs. Indeed Americans seem 
to J apanese comparatively free of restraints on behavior other than those 
derived from their religious， moral or political beliefs: usually if Americans 
believe themselves justified in some course of action by those beliefs， they 
feel free to act. Feelings of uneasiness or compunction which cannot be fit 
into a moral or religious theory are ignored or brushed aside as irrational 
emotion. In sum， from the Japanese point of view， social behavior in the 
West and especially in America is structured by reified verbal formulations 
- vast theologies and complex moral philosophies - which are seen by 
Americans not as the imaginative creations of men， but as objectively and 
independently true accounts， often revealed by God Himself， of the way 
things are. Religious commandments and moral principles derived from such 
complex systems of reified images and ideas provide the criteria by which 
Americans judge and justify their behavior and the behavior of others. 
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Extensions and refinements of such religious commandments and moral 
principles are often incorporated into law: thus law seems to Americans a 
natural means of structuring society. 
One reason that J apan is so interesting is that， even from the American 
point of view， itseems to be a society in which comparatively 1itle reifica-
tion goes on. Religious and political beliefs are not constitutive of the 
individual Japanese. For Americans， what seems to be reified in Japan 
are social practices determining what is appropriate behavior in everyday 
social situations. Rather than fol1ow principles articulated in abstract 
terms， J apanese in everyday life situations feel compelled to act in socially 
appropriate ways with socially appropriate fee1ings. There is 1it1e interest 
in general moral， religious， or political theory to justify action in accord 
with these felt compulsions beyond a vague reference to what is natura1. 
The Japanese permit themselves to think almost anything， allowing 
themselves a rich imaginative life so free of constraint that it often seems 
perverse from the American point of view.ll However， reified standards of 
appropriate behavior detailing what to say and to do in al social situations 
sharply restrict the J apanese from acting out these imaginative thoughts戸
There is virtua11y no tradition of political philosophy in J apan because 
shared standards for how one should act and how one should feel in al 
situations in everyday life render unnecessary social coordination and 
control by means of theory. Because standards for human behavior in every綱
day situations were and are so deeply ingrained， deviation is comparatively 
unthinkable and there is lit1e tradition of theoretical justification for such 
deviation. (Peasants revolted during the Edo Period because they were 
starving and they had no choice. They did not seek a philosophy to justify 
rebellion because they were not fami1iar with the practice of justifying 
deviant action with a reference to religion or political philosophy， for 
11. See Ian Buruma， BEHIND THE MASK: ON SEXUAL DEMONS， SACRED MOTHERS， 
TRANSVESTITES， GANGSTERS AND OTHER JAPANESE CULTURAL HEROES (1984)， 
originally published as A JAPANESE MIRROR (1983). 
12. “A strict sense of hierarchy effectively prev巴ntsindividuals from asserting themselves and 
thereby unbalancing the harmony of the group. Violent confrontation between individuals is not 
restrained so much by a universal sense of morality (what the British like to cal decency)， asby a 
system of etiquette more rigid than anything seen in the contemporary Western world. But this 
system is based almost entirely on known human relationships; without i group to Ielate it to， ittends 
to break down rather quickly. . . Outward harmony is preserved in many different ways. While in 
the West a person is supposed to have opinions， which he or she voices in public， inJapan， opinions， 
if held at al，訂e"keptto oneself or carefully blended with those held by others. Political discussions 
are generally avoided altogether." Id. at 221. 
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example， God or human rights.)13 Just as no theory can justify deviation in 
J apan， sono theory is necessary to justify adherence to customary daily stand.. 
dards of behavior. General rules or principles (inc1uding laws) are compara-
tively unnecessary for controlling or coordinating Japanese social behavior. 
From the Japanese point of view， law is an extraordinarily inefficient 
means of coordinating human behavior. First， established governmental 
authorities must lay down rules for everyone to follow. Certain minimum 
standards of coherence and pub1ication and enforcement of these rules must 
be met. These necessarily. general rules must be interpreted and app1ied to 
individual cases. The reifications necessary to support allegiance to the law 
are massive and difficult to sustain. The divine right of kings， natural rights， 
and the rest of the Western tradition of po1itical philosophy illustrate how 
difficult it can be. The extraordinary complexity of law， especially 
American law， and the social resources its processes consume， also count 
against law as a means for organizing a society戸
1 said above that there is comparatively litle reification in J apan. 
My discussion .of the extraordinarily high degree of reification of the 
etiquette of everyday life in Japan suggests otherwise. However， asnoted 
above， the Japanese do not provide a reified world view to support their 
reification of the etiquette of ordinary life. There is no elaborate cos-
mology or theology which justifies adherence to everyday roles. lndeed， 
J apanese seem to be able to detach themselves remarkably easi1y from their 
external performances. They do not even reify standards of appropriate 
behavior in the way that Americans are apt to reify rules of behavior which 
Americans apply to themselves and others. On the contrary， violation of 
appropriate standards of behavior is comparatively easily countenanced in 
J apan when the needs. and wishes of the people in the immediate social 
situation require it. The constant use in daily conversation of the dichotomy 
between tatemae and honne， the formal surface of human relations and the 
13. See M. Maruyama， STUDIES IN THE INTELLECTUAL HISTORY OF TOKUGAWA 
JAPAN 249-311 (1952， tr.by M. Hane 1974) for an account of th巴担vesand writings of some 
intellectuals of the late Edo period and their lack of influence on any of the uprisings of that period. 
See also H. Borton， PEASANT UPRISINGS IN JAPAN OF THE TOKUGAWA PERIOD (2nd ed. 
1968) and M. Hane， PEASANTS， REBELS AND OUTCASTS (1982). 
14. The law of Japan is simpler and les voluminous than the law of a single American state. 
My Japanese law students were bemused by even a simple case in which a federal court sitting in 
Massachusetts had to decide， in order to decide the case before it， whether the state courts of 
Massachusetts， ifthe case had been in state court， would have applied the law of Massachusetts or of 
NewYork. 
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reality of real human beings in a real situation， indicates the wi1lingness 
of the J apanese to set aside the formal aspect of social roles whenever the 
immediate needs and wants of the people in the immediate situation require 
it戸 InJapanese society， the sheer fact that someone wants something is 
usually considered a good reason to give it to him or her. And why not? 
What better reason could there be? Yet in America， we are strangely 
reluctant to give our wants as reasons for getting something. Americans 
must first have their wants approved by God， or a moral theory， or some 
other reified entit1ement such as a legal right before those wants can serve 
as justifications for getting something. 
Americans， much more than Japanese， seem to regard the sheer following 
of a rule as a good in itself， regardless of the actual consequences involved in 
following the rule in a giveri situation. The passion for rule-following shows 
in the value which Americans attach to acting on principle， no matter what 
the consequences. For Americans， principles or rules have an independent 
authority to dictate what should be done by human actors in a given situa“ 
tion. The J apanese are， from the point of、viewof Americans， remarkably 
uncaring about whether their actions are “principled" or “justified." They 
are much more concerned about what action the immediate situation cals 
fOr.16 The American is apt to c1aim that what the immediate situation cals 
for cannot be known without an examination of what principles or rules 
15. In contrast， see the description of social roles among the people of Bali in C. Geertz， ，‘From 
the Native's Point of View": On The Nature of Anthropological Understanding， MEANING IN 
ANTHROPOLOGY 221 (1975). According to Geertz， the people of Bali conceive of the human 
person as a representative of a generic type rather than as a unique creature with a private fate. The 
generic types are roles in a cosmic drama. The roles are what really exist; the play巴rsar巴incidental.
There is a constant fear“that the public performance to which one's cultural location commits one 
will be botched and that the personality - as we would cal it but the Balinese， ofcourse， not believ-
ing in such a thing， would not - of the individual will break through to dissolve his standardized 
public identity.... It is the fear of faux pas， rendered only that much more probable by the extra-
ordinary ritualization of daily life， that keeps social intercourse on its deliberately narrowed rails and 
protects the dramatistical s巴nseof self against th巴 disruptivethreat implicit in the immediacy and 
spontaneity even the most passionate ceremoniousness cannot fully eradicate from face嶋to-faceen-
counters." Id. at 230. 
Social roles are constitutive of the Japanese sense of self. See text at notes 28-31 infra. How-
ever， the extraordinary denial of the personality and the uncompromisingly demanding quality of 
social roles which Ge巴rtzfound among the Balinese is as strange to Japanese as it is to Americans. See 
Wagatsuma and Rosett， note 4 supra at 85 for a discussion of tatemae and honne. 
16. “. . . there can be no doubt that the Japanese on the whole do think les in terms of abstract 
ethical principles than do Westerners and more in terms of concrete situations and complex human 
feelings. To the Westerner the Japanese may seem weak or even lacking in principles; to the Japanese 
the Westerner may seem harsh and self-righteous in his judgements and lacking in human fe巴lings."
E. Reischauer， THE JAPANESE 140 (1977). 
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should govern the situation. Americans tend to characterize both morality 
and law as primarily a matter of following rules. From the Japanese point of 
view， one needs no rule or principle to justify helping oneself or others to 
enjoy 1ife or to avoid obvious difficu1ties. For the Japanese， both morality 
and law are concerned les with rule following and more with people's 
attitudes. For example， a Japanese policeman instructing student drivers 
would stress“traffic morality" rather than “traffic rules." Traffic morality 
is an attitude of care and concern for other drivers and pedestrians. Good 
drivers have such an attitude and drive accordingly. After a traffic accident， 
the J apanese are generally less concerned with fixing responsibility for the 
accident than are Americans， and more concerned with the personal resolve 
of everyone involved in the accident never to let it happen againP 
11 
A recent seminar discussion 1 had with graduate law students at Osaka 
University provides an illustration of the different ways in which J apanese 
and Americans approach a moral question戸 τhetopic was a 1985 
American criminal case set in Santa Monica， California in which a J apanese 
mother， age 32， who had lived in the United States for 14 years， attempted 
to ki1 herself and her two children by walking into the sea. All three were 
pulled from the surf by passing college students， but the woman's six-month噸
old daughter and four-year-old son did not survive. The woman was charged 
with first-degree murder. Eventually the charge was reduced to voluntary 
manslaughter and she was released on probation on the condition that she 
17. It is very unusual for a judge in a tort cas巴 inJapan to find any defendant more than 70% 
liable. There are no punitive damages in Japan and compensatory damages are typically very low by 
American standards. 1 am indebted to Professor Takeshi Tsunoda for the example of“traffic rules" 
四 d“trafficmorality." 
In criminal cases in Japan， a truly repentent potential def，巴ndantis usually not prosecuted. If the 
crime is too serious for the police and prosecutor to excuse， then the tmly repentant defendant is 
given a light or a suspended sentence. Contesting a criminal charge is conclusive evidence that one is 
not repentent. The only defendants who seriously contest criminal charges in Japan are the obviously 
unrepentant such as professional criminals， or the tmly innocent. Fewer than 1 % of those who 
cont巴stcriminal charges are found innocent at a court trial; the only real protection for the innocent 
in Japan is the quality and professionalism of Japanese police and prosecutors. The system works well 
in ordinary criminal cases， but offers no protection in political cases. For an interesting overview of 
the criminal proc泡sin Japan， see Bayley， The lndividual and Authoriか， FORCES OF ORDER: 
POLICE BEHAVIOR IN JAPAN AND THE UNITED STATES 134 (1976). 
18. 1 am indebted to Professor Mitsukuni Yasaki and to Tochi Ashida， Yuichi Hashiguchi， LaNel 
Hegelgans， Nobuyuki Kataoka， Takanori Mikami， Kazuo Nakahara， and Michiyuki Shimoda for their 
contributions to the discussion described in the text. 
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undergo psychiatric counseling.19 
The seminar discussion did not focus on the attempted suicide. The 
J apanese students made the point that， contrary to the stereotype accepted 
by some Americans， suicide is not generally condoned in J apan. (Suicide 
rates are not much higher in Japan than in the United States. Suicide rates 
for most Northern European countries are higher than for Japan.)20 We al 
agreed that the woman was disturbed and needed counseling. The major 
point at issue was whether， given that the woman made the mistake of 
attempting to commit suicide， itwas even worse that she decided to take 
her children with her. The Japanese students generally fe1t that they would 
have thought les of the mother if she had decided to leave her children 
behind. They stressed the c10seness and strength of the mother-child bond 
and the duty of the mother always to keep her children with her， even if it 
meant taking them with her into death. 
1 argued that for the woman to kil her children because she was herself 
unhappy and had decided to kil herself was a gross dereliction of her duty 
as a mother. Her inability to separate her own interests from those of her 
children， and her failure to imagine her children living on without her， 
seemed to me self-centered and selfish， excusable perhaps;l but never 
moral1y justifiable. The mother might be forgiven， but on what possible 
basis could she be said to have been a better mother by ki1ling her children? 
The students insisted on their position which c1early rested on the 
strength of the mother-child relationship. In Japanese， that relationship is 
cal1ed isshin do tai ( っ心1r:i1f:本)， literal1y， one heart same body. In trying to 
translate into English their understanding of っ心IriJi本 ， the students 
considered and quickly rejected the idea that a child was the mother's 
property. An analogy to the American problem with abortion was 
suggested. Perhaps the child was like a fetus which the mother could kil1 if 
she chose. But both the property analogy and the fetus analogy seemed to 
go in the wrong direction. The right to dispose of property or of a fetus 
19. Los Angeles Times， November 21， 1985. 
20. STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF THE UNITED STATES 845 (1985). 
21. Murder of children by one of their parents during a suicide attempt (oyako-shinju， Iiterally， 
parent-child dying) accounts for almost twenty-five percent of al homicid巴sin Japan. Los Angeles 
Times， J anuary 31， 1985. The official reason that the woman was not given a more severe sentence by 
the California court is that court-appointed psychiatrists concluded that she was suffering from 
psychotic depression and delusions when she walked into the sea with her children. The California 
judge expressly denied that he gave any weight to cultural differences in determining the woman's 
sentence. Los Angeles Times， November 22，1985. 
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depends on their being only a chattel in the case of property， ornot a person 
in the case of a fetus?2 In this case， the mother's defense rested on the 
c10seness of the mother to her chi1dren， not the difference or dissimi1arity. 
But what kind of c10seness could justify her in killing her children? 
It finally because c1ear that the stu.dents and 1 were describing the choice 
the woman made in very different terms. 1 thought the issue was whether 
the woman could justify her choice to kil her chi1dren. The students saw 
the issue as whether the woman was going to act like a J apanese mother and 
make no distinction between her interests and her chi1dren's interests. From 
the students' point of view， itwas generally a plus that the emotional attach-
ment of the woman to her chi1dren was so strong that she could not bear the 
thought of her children without her; if the mother had chosen to leave the 
children behind， itwould have been evidence that her attachment to her 
chi1dren was not as strong as it should have been and thus the woman was 
not a good mother. The students agreed that the woman's initial decision 
to kil herself was an irresponsible one for a mother of two small children to 
make， but leaving the children behind would have been additional evidence 
of her unfitness as a mother. 
Americans will object that even if the role of mother requires never 
making a distinction between the mother's interests and her children's 
interests， the requirements of that role must be subordinate to the more 
general requirement to be a moral person who does not kil (except under 
extraordinary circumstances clear1y not present in this case). For 
Americans， the essential self is a person constrained by morality， who then 
happens to be a woman and a mother: the requirements of the role of 
“moral person" outweigh the requirements of the role of mother戸
For Japanese， the priority is reversed. The general requirements of the 
role of “moral person" control only if they do not conflict with the more 
natura11y grounded and everyday role of mother. The J apanese do not place 
22. Abortion is not the moral issue in Japan that it is in the United States. Because the 
Japanese do not generally believe in an omniscient judgmental God who forbids abortion as a mortal 
sin， and because motherhood is taken so seriously in Japan (few Japanese mothers will hire a baby-
sitter and there are almost no day care centers in Japan; women usually stop working when they have 
small children) the policy of using the threat of criminal prosecution to force women to give birth to 
chi1dren they do not want has litle support. 
23. An American might want to bui1d the injunction not to kil one's children into the role of 
mother rather than think of the role of mother as requiring that one always keep one's chi1dren with 
one and then having that requirement overridd巴nby the requirement of the role of “moral person" 
not to kil. This seems only a semantic difference. Separating the role of mother from that of“moral 
person" highlights the difference between the Japanese and the American point of view. 
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much importance on a general morality contro1ing relations between 
“persons" abstracted away ftom their actual social roles. From the Japanese 
perspective， the Western idea of a moral person abstracted away from actual 
social roles seems a reification of Western religious ideas of the naked soul 
subject to judgment by an omniscient God. Much more important for 
Japanese is the role of mother which requires that a mother make no distinc雌
tion between her own interests and her chi1dren's interests. Conformity to 
those requirements can sometimes have the unfortunate consequences of 
the Ca1ifornia case， but ninety-nine percent of the time it obviously benefits 
both mother and chi1dren. 
From the Japanese point of view， Americans think that everyone in the 
wor1d has one primary role，“moral person" or “soul before God." The role 
is so abstract and empty of content that it provides litle guidance in dai1y 
1ife. The undue importance given to such an abstract role tends to decrease 
the importance attached to more concrete roles such as mother or son， with 
the result that Americans， from the Japanese point of view， do not take 
seriously enough their everyday roles and relationships. 
For Americans however， this detachment from the requirements of the 
particular social roles of dai1y life is perhaps the defining characteristic of 
American freedom. Professor George Kateb， an American political scientist， 
has eloquently expressed this point of view. 
The American self is a loose-fitting self. Americans are characteristical1y un-
formed， restles， self-doubting， and constantly putting on some new aspect only to 
discard it as unfitting. The scene has its own aesthetic but it is not likely to satisfy 
the sensibility of old Europe. Europe and the whole Old World are bui1t on roles: 
more roles than American society c1early has and consciously defines; roles that are 
more . sharply differentiated from each other; roles that are more ful1y or more 
permanent1y enacted. . . [In America] every self is imagined as never finished， never 
exhausted by its failures and successes， encouraged to think th証tit has indefinite 
resources for change in the midst of changing experience.24 
The extraordinary freedom of Americans from their social roles can also 
produce its own pathology: 
. . a world-absorbing egoism; a lethal1y indifferent privatism; terible confusion and 
drifting; a ca1culated spontaneity; an unconscious guile; a compulsive play-acting; an 
unappeasable wish to‘score'; a merely additive quest for unconnected experience; 
a search for nove1ty and sensations; a fickle mobility; and so on戸
24. Kateb， On the 'Legitination Crisis，' LEGITIMACY AND THE STATE 180 at 197鴫98
何人Connollyed. 1984). 
25. Id. at 199. 
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Professor Kateb concedes the possible pathology， yet celebrates the 
American self. 
The American characteristically seeks to experiment with himself and with 
natural reality， and thus touches the polar extremes of savagery and self-conscious-
ness， rapacity and etherealization. Loneliness inevitably fils the adventurous self. 
Yet the sum of extreme experience added to the human record justi白esthe pain 
enduredand inflicted. The American self enlarges humanity. . . [It] includes the 
voluntary principle and the will to be adventurous， and never loses al connection to 
the feeling of being besieged and the insistence on imagining oneself self-owned.26 
J apanese find this American conception of the self almost incomprehen-
sible. When they do understand it， they are usually appalled. The “loose-
fitting self" which imagines itself“self-owned" and can try on social roles 
at will seems to them a conception of the self as bizarre as that of the 
Balinese?7 
The American sense of self described above carries with it a certain 
picture of the self. The self is an abstract qua1ity (the soul or ego) which 
inhabits the body. Physical space absolutely divides one individual from 
another. Americans distinguish sharply between (a) the attributes of the 
individual (his physical and mental characteristics， his abilities， knowledge 
and ski1s) which are portable and move around in space with the body and 
(b) the social situations and roles in which the individual chooses (or is 
forced) to participate. In J apan， this sharp distinction is not made. One's 
social roles and social relations are adual1y constitutive of the self. 
A recent analysis by a leading J apanese scholar contrasts the Euro-
American “individual" with the J apanese “contextual. "28 
26. Id. at 196. 
27. See supra note 15. 
28. “Let usnow redefine individuals as actors who objectify the [Euro-American] self only. 
These individual actors are the ultimate units of social entities because further division is impossible. 
These individuals have a high degree of individuality in the sense that they have a firm consciousness 
of themselves， mak巴fredecisions based on their own judgment and sense of responsibi1ity， and巴xert
their best eforts to do their jobs by themselves. At the same time， relationships among people tend to 
be conc巴ptuallysevered from the actor. This implies that， for an individual， relationships among 
people have been derived from the associations of individual actors and are perceived as the objective 
means for his survival. Therefore， relations among individuals are seen as something that can be mani-
pulated. . . In contrast， a r巴lationalactor is estab1ished when relationships with other actors are 
objectified， emphasizing the co-existentiality (or complementarity) between the写elationships and 
people. The relational actor represents a type of actor which is fundamentally different from the 
so1ipsistic individual actor. Both Wats司i'sningen (人I¥J; people as“in between") who live in 
γinkan" (人I¥J;“inbetween" people) and Kimura's hito (人 man)who exists in“hito to hito to no 
aida" (人と人との!日 betweenman and man) corresponds to this type of actor. Let us use the 
term kanjin (I¥J人)or“contextual，"to conceptually distinguish the type of man who isa relational 
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In contrast to an individual， a: contextual is neither an extension of an ego nor a 
connection of egos. For the contextual a sense of identification with others (some-
times including conflict) pre-exists and selfness is confirmed only through inter鴫
personal relationships戸
In other words， for the Japanese， one is one's share in social relation-
ships， not metaphorically， but literally. A common word for the self in 
J apanese is jibun which denotes in any given social situation “the share 
that is distributed to oneself derived from the life space which is commonly 
shared by both oneself and other actors."30 The extraordinary strength of 
the mother-child bond in J apan illustrates this contextual definition of the 
self. For the Japanese， being a mother is as much an attribute of a person 
as her height， or her temperament， or her eye color. Americans think of a 
mother and child as two individuals who happen to be related in a certain 
(important) way. Japanese think of mother and child as indivisible p訂 tsof a 
whole - isshin dδtai - one heart same body. 
Understanding the Japanese conception of the self as contextual helps 
us to understand the strength of the mother-child bond in J apan. It is also 
the beginning of general explanation of the nature of the “mutual trust，" 
“personal interdependence，" and “group harmony" which the J apanese 
value so much. In a society made up of “contextuals" rather than “indi-
viduals，" terms such as“trust" and “interdependence" and “harmony" do 
not describe moral goals to be achieved by individuals; they are descriptions 
of a society of mature human beings戸
actor from the “individual" or kojin (II~I 人). . . . Thecontextual model fits the Japanese." E. Hama-
guchi， A Contextual Model of the Japanese: Toward a Methodological lnnovation in Japan Studies， 
11:2 JOURNAL OF JAPANESE STUDlES 289 at 299-300 (1985). 
29. ld. at 302. 
30. ld. at 302. 
31 “In contrast to the ego， th巴jibunappears to have a relational and relative character. Hence 
there has been a tendency to regard its holders as being dependent upon other actors and thus 
immature. In reality， however， among the Japanese one observes not unilateral dependence upon 
others butinterdependence. Furthermore， for this interdependence b巴tweenactors toむe
maintained， desir巴sof the jibun cannot be selfishly satisfied， and the social system must in-
cessantly demand self-restraint. Thus， self-restraint can be seen as the appropriate behavior of 
socialy mature adults. It is the straight-forward claim of the naked ego that is consider巴dto be 
childish." ld. at 303. 
Professor Hamaguchi uses the distinction between the individual and the contextual to criticize 
the work of scholars such as Reischauer and Nakane who have correctly described the Japanese as 
group-oriented but have used a Western analytic fram巴workwhich is limited to the contrast of 
individual versus group and which !eads inevitably to the conclusion that the Japanese “individual" is 
immersed and subordinated in the group. But Japanese contextuals are in fact fulfiled by particip缶
tion with others in the social roles which constitute them. Being under the threat of separation from 
the group is experienced as a potential los of self， just as being under the threat of not being able to 
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More important for my purposes in this essay， the account of Japan as a 
society of contextuals suggests a general explanation for the J apanese 
indifference to lawyers， courts， and legal codes. If Euro-American legal 
institutions are essentially tied. to a Euro-American conception of the self， 
then it is no wonder that there is so lit1e enthusiasm for law in Japan. 
Interestingly， a conception of the self as beseiged， self-owned， and 
engaged in a continual struggle against others to maintain his or her self.嗣
sufficiency and freedom， yet requiring relations with others to live， isthe 
main theme of the American intellectual movement called Critical Legal 
Studies. One of the central texts of that movement by Professor Duncan 
Kennedy of the Harvard Law School argues that the very essence of every 
problem in American law is“that relations with others are both necessary to 
and incompatible with our freedom. "32 
leave a group is experienced as a potential loss of self by the Western individua1. Id. at 296・297
See a1so Hiroshi Wagatsuma， Some Cu1tural Assumptions Among the Japanese， J APAN QUARTERL Y 
371 at 374 (1984). 
32. “Here is an initial statement of th巴 fundamentalcontradiction: Most participants in 
American legal culture believe that the goal of individual freedom is at the same time dependent 
on and incompatible with the communal coercive action that is necessary to achieve it. Others 
(family， friends， bureaucrats， cultural figures， the state) are necessary if we are to become persons 
at al一 theyprovide us the stuff of our selves and protect us in crucial ways against destruc-
tion.... But at the same time that it forms and protects us， the universe of others (family， friend-
ship， bureaucracy， culture， the state) threatens us with annihilation and urges upon us forms of 
fusion that are quite plainly bad rather than good. A 合iendcan reduc泡 meto misery with a 
single look. Numberless conformities， large and small abandonments of self to others， are the 
price of what freedom we experience in society. And the price is a high one. Through our 
existence as memb巴rsof collectives， we impose on others and have imposed on us hierarchical 
structures of power， welfare， and access to enlightenment that are illegitimate， whether based 
on birth into a particular social class or on the accident of genetic endowment. . .The funda-
mental contradiction - that relations with others証reboth necessary to and incompatible with 
our freedom -is not only intense. lt is also pervasive. First， itis an aspect of our experience of 
every form of social life. lt釘 isesin the relations of lovers， spouses， parents and children， 
neighbors， employers and employees， trading partners， colleagues， and so forth. Second， within 
law， aslaw is commonly defined， it is not only an aspect， but the very essence of every problem. 
There simply are no legal issues that do not involve directly the problem of the legitimate content 
of collective coercion， since there is by definition no legal problem until someone has at least 
imagined that he might invoke the force of the state. And it is not just a matter of definition. 
The more sophisticated a person's legal thinking， regardless of her political stance， the more likely 
she is to believe that al issues within a doctrinal field reduce to a single dilemma of the degree 
of collective as opposed to individual self. 
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The usual Japanese reaction to this is that the idea of some fundamental 
contradiction between the freedom of the self and participation in society is 
a very Westem idea; either the fundamental contradiction does not exist in 
Japan or， ifit does， the basic fear is not of annihilation of the self by others 
but of 、isolationof the self from others.ιWhat Americans experience， in
Professor Kennedy's apt phrase， as“numberless conformities， large and small 
abandonments of self to others，" Japanese experience as reaffirmations of 
the contextual self. What Japanese fear most is not the oppression or stifling 
of individuality by the group， but separation from the group which， for 
J apanese， isequivalent to a loss of self戸
If Professor五ennedy34is right that the essence of every legal problem 
is the fundamental contradiction “that relations with others are both 
necessary to and incompatible with our freedom，" and if it is also true that 
the contextual nature of the Japanese sense of self does not generate the 
same contradiction， then we have a general explanation for the curious 
This article，. by two young Canadian law professors， isa good and fair outside appraisal of the 
Critical Legal Studies movement. The authors ask whether Professor Kennedy's fundamental con-
tradiction "is not itself an illusion， th巴inescapableconsequence of a false consciousness that provides 
us with impov巴rishednotions of freedom and community. Any attempt to answer this question must 
begin with a theory of human persona1ity." Id. at 239. 
1 think that Hutchinson & Monahan are right that the America definition of the self is what 
generates the fundamental contradiction and also right that the American conception of the self may 
rest on a reification and be an illusion. 
The fundamental contradiction has been a theme of West巴rnphilosophy since Hegel. For a 
recent sophisticated treatment see Kolb， THE CRITIQUE OF PURE MODERNITY: HEGEL， HEI-
DEGGER， AND AFTER (1986). See also Unger， PASSION: AN ESSAY ON PERSONALITY (1984). 
33. See not巴31supra. 
34. Americans may find it odd that 1 refer to Professor Kennedy rather just Kennedy. For 
Americans， Kenn巴dyis a person who happens to have a job as a professor at the Harvard Law School. 
His job is not an essential characteristic of him， either for himself or for oth巴rAmericans. Using his title 
seems a bit formal. (See Kennedy， Afterword: Psych-Social CLS: A Comment on the Cardozo Sympo-
sium 6 CARDOZO L.R. 1013 (1985) for interesting comments by Kennedy on his own social status.) 
In Japan it sounds odd to omit a person's title. Inde巴da person's name is more 1ikely to be 
omitted than his title. For Japanese， the title of professor is much more than a job description or a 
status achieved by an individual. A Japan巴seperson who is a professor is p釘tof a complex set of 
relations with colleagues and students which define what he essentially is. At the beginning of each 
academic year in Japan， there is an elaborate c巴remonyat which the parents of ent巴ringstudents hand 
their children over to the care of the faculty. The phrase， inloco parentis， isinadequate to describe 
the complex set of reciprocal duties which tie studentsand faculty together and which often last a 1ife-
time. When a junior scholar joins a facu1ty， he is already known to that faculty because he is a former 
student of a senior faculty memもer，and when he joins， he joins for life. A1though academic 1if，巴 in
Japan is generally more contextually defined than business 1ife， the fundamental terms of al soci 
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indifference of the Japanese to Western law. Western law and legal institu帽
tions were developed in response to pro bletns of the self which the J apanese 
do not have. 
Among major modern industrial societies， the United States and Japan 
seem to represent the extremes of individua1ism and contextua1ism. Most 
other societies seem to be located between these extremes with social roles 
being more important than they are in the United States but less important 
than they are in J apan戸Itis also true that the United States and J apan 
seem to represent the extremes in terms of using law to structure society. 
In Japan， where social roles are constitutive of the self and thus cannot be 
changed without a fundamental change of the self， the requirements of 
those roles provide social order without much need for law. In the United 
States， where the individual can change social roles 1ike he or she changes 
clothes， the artificial structure of law may be the only alternative to social 
chaos. 
IV 
The structure of the J apanese language reflects and reinforces the 
Japanese sense of the self as contextual. 
By the age ofthree， children in the United States have genera11y mastered the 
distinction between “!" and “you，" two personal pronouns that will serve them 
throughout life in a1 interactions with others. Furthermore， inthe daily speech of 
the American child， these two terms are heavily favored over a1 other possible 
personal referents， such as name， kin term， and the like. The Japanese male child， for 
his part， by the age of six must master the use of at least six terms of self-reference; 
gir1s of that age wi1l employ five. (For persons addressed or referred to， the situation 
is even more complicated， for both boys and gir1s regularly use a rninimum of four-
teen such terms.) Japanese children also use names， kin terms， and place names， but 
the rea11y striking contrast with the American child's speech habits is that none of 
the possible options is c1early dominant among Japanese children. With overwhelm-
ing frequency they use no self-referent of any kind.36 
35. From the point of view，of the rest of the world， the conc巴ptionof the self prevalent in the 
United States may be les familiar than the contextual self of Japan. 
“The Western conception of the person as a bounded， unique， more or les integrated 
motivational and cognitive universe， a dynamic center of awareness‘emotion， judgment， and 
action organized into a distinctive whole and set contrastively both against other such ¥Vholes叩 d
against its social and natural background， is， however incorigible it may seem to us， a rather 
peculiar idea within the context of the world's cultures." Geertz， supra note 15 at 225. 
36. R. J. Smith supra note 32 at 78-79. 
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Furthermore， the various words which can be used to refer to oneself and 
others are usually words indicating social or physical place or distance. 
For example， a polite way to refer to someone standing next to oneself 
is kochira， literally，“in this direction." One generally uses completely 
different words to describe a given situation depending on the age， sex， and 
status of the speaker compared to the age， sex， and status of .the person to 
whom one is speaking and/or the person about whom one is speaking. 
Anything which can be understood from the context of the speaker's act of 
speaking， including usually the “subject" of the sentence， isomitted. In 
sum， the use of language is so contextually conditioned that the idea of 
grammar as applied to spoken J apanese is often perceived by J apanese 
people as an importation from the West. To make sense of this idea， 
consider the contrast with English. 
We can ask conceming any written or spoken English sentence whether 
it is grammatical independent of any occasion on which the sentence is 
actually used. There is in English a fairly clear distinction between the 
grammatical correctness of an English sentence and the appropriateness of 
uttering that sentence on a particular occasion. This distinction is much 
less clear in Japanese. The utility of the idea of grammar is limited for 
the J apanese because speaking “grammatically" in Japanese is a compara-
tively small part of speaking J apanese well， while for English， speaking 
“grammatically" is virtually equivalent to speaking English well. 
For the Japanese， acts of speaking are often only component parts of 
acts of social behavior. For the hundreds of repeated actions in daily life， 
there is usually some one or a ve巧rfew verbal formulas it is appropriate to 
utter on each such occasion. The constant formulaic use of language 
strongly reinforces the contextual sense of self and converts many acts of 
speaking into standard moves in social “games."37 
Americans tend to regard the English language as something there to be 
leamed by anybody， similar to geometry or engineering (English grammar) 
and similar to typing or skiing (the practice it takes to be able to speak a 
language). Because speaking Japanese is so inseparable from Japanese social 
37. The idea that language is no more than social behavior revolutionized twentieth century 
Western philosophy， but has always been taken for granted in Japan. The theories of knowledge， 
meaning， reference， and truth which made the idea of language as social behavior seem so revolu-
tionary in the West never got started in Japan. The best account of the demise of thos巴theories
within Western philosophy is Rorty， PHILOSOPHY AND THE MIRROR OF NATURE (1979). See 
also Rorty， CONSEQUENCES OF PRAGMATISM (1982). 
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behavior， the Japanese regard speaking Japanese as Japanese-style behavior， 
similar to wearing a kimono. Foreigners who learn to speak J apanese 
fluently are seen by the Japanese as imitating Japanese behavior. Almost 
invariably the imitation is not a good one. A perfect imitation requires 
the speaker to have internalized J apanese attitudes， to have a contextual 
sense of self. 
To an extraordinary degree， being J apanese is behavioral1y defined. If 
a child whose parents are J apanese is taken by them out of J apan at age five 
and does not return to J apan until age fifteen， itis likely that he wil1 always 
be regarded as not really J apanese by other J apanese. His physical move綱
ments， his tone of voice， and his choice of words will reveal foreign 
influences. Just his ability to speak another language sets him apart. 
A1though others may admit the usefulness of being able to speak another 
language， that is， to imitate the behavior of foreigners， ifhe does it too 
wel1， he becomes potentially untrustworthy， more 1ikely at any time to 
ignore the demands of the contextual self戸
The English language is seen by Americans as made up of words which 
can be put together into sentences. The same English sentence can be 
expressed in speech or in writing. The words and sentences of Eng1ish， 
which can be expressed in speech or in writing， refer to concepts and pro-
positions which are the meanings of those English words and sentences. 
Concepts and propositions can be expressed in English words and sentences 
or in the words and sentences of another language. Different languages are 
seen by Americans as different systems of words and sentences for the 
expression of the same concepts and propositions. In sum， we have the 
fol1owing hierarchy. 
/ 1¥¥ 
Words and Sentences 
in Language A 
/¥ 
Speaking Writing 
Words and Sentences 
in Language B 
/¥ 
Speaking Writing 
Words and Sentences 
in Language X 
/¥ 
Speaking Writing 
38. Even someone such as Prime Minister Nakasone comes under some suspicion just because he 
speaks English so wel. Americans might a1so lok askance at a presidential candidate f1uent in French 
(or Jap叩 ese)，but the reservations are much greater in Jap阻.
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A sentence within a given 1anguage is an abstraction away frorn various acts 
of speaking and writing. For Westerners， the French sentence，“Toutes 1es 
hommes sont morte1s，" and the English sentence，“All rnen are morta1，" 
express the same proposition. These sentences “mean the same thing，" that 
is， express the same proposition， whether they are written or spoken. The 
major purpose of speaking or writing is the expression of concepts and 
propositions， that is， the expression of rneaning. In the West， propositions 
were the inventions of Greek phi1osophers who wrote the first systematic 
treatises on 10gic. Logic was thought to be the study of the re1ationships 
between propositions， that is， the re1ationships between the meanings of 
sentences abstracted away frorn the sentences of any actua11anguage. Logic 
seemed to the Greeks and to Westerners until the twentieth century a 
kind of know1edge superior to al other kinds of know1edge， prior to al 
experience， and true in al possib1e wor1ds. The notion that the study of 
1anguage abstracted away from the behavior of speakers and writers and 
from any actua1 1anguage provided answers to the rnost fundamenta1 ques樽
tions reached its zenith in Kant and in phi1osophica1 idealism. Phi1osophical 
idealism suggested that 1anguage in the abstracted forrn of eoncepts of time， 
space， causation， etc. actually determined the shape of the world of everyday 
experience. In this sense， Westerners saw themse1ves living within language 
instead of sirnp1y using it as a too1 for cornmunication as we do non-verbal 
gestures. The history of twentieth-century Western phi1osophy has been a 
history of the disrnant1ing and abandonment of these reifications of acts of 
speaking and writing. Logic， for example， isno longer thought of as revealing 
the necessary structure of the wor1d or as“the laws of thought." Instead 
various interesting 10gics are invented and used for a wide variety of pur-
poses. Large sca1e theories of knowledge， rneaning， reference， and truth are 
rapidly being abandoned as uninteresting topics of discussion， inthe same 
way that many scholars in the eighteenth century turned their attention 
from theo10gy to physics戸
From the Japanese point ofview， the reification involved in this Western 
phi1osophica1 tradition which put mankind “inside" of his acts of speaking 
and writing was rnassive indeed. Why did the J apanese never take the same 
path? Part of the exp1ana 
39. Seesupra notes 10 and 37. 
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hierarchy illustrated above in which speaking and writing are seen as two 
ways of expressing the same “sentence" was never p1ausib1e to the Japanese， 
and so the subsequent move from “sentences" to“concepts and proposi-
tions" and “10gic" was never made. 
As we have seen， speaking Japanese is primari1y face-to-face socia1 
behavior. Writing J apanese is more like painting. The heart of written 
J apane$e is characters inherited from the Chinese. These characters or 
kanji are often literally pictures of the wor1d rather than written symbo1s 
for spoken words. Simp1e pictures (木 standsfor tree，冬 standsfor a 
winter) are combined into more a comp1ex picture (柊standsfor holly). 
家 forhouse， and女 forwoman， combine to嫁 formarried woman. These 
sing1e characters can be combined into more comp1ex compounds. 電 for
e1ectricity and話 forconversation combine to電話 forte1ephone. Simplify 
家 to，. ， combine with女 andadd全 (perfect)to get安全 (safety).An 
important feature of J apanese which prevents the identification of speaking 
and writing is that when written J apanese is read a10ud， any given character 
may be pronounced in a number of ways. Thus家主 isread a10ud as 
yanushi (house owner) whi1e家族 isread a10ud as kazoku (fami1y) and家
by itse1f is read as ie (house). The reference of家 tohouse remains the 
same， but the sound varies. Virtually al characters in J apanese have at 1east 
two pronunciations. In addition， J apanese is a 1anguage with re1ative1y few 
sounds， so a sing1e sound can stand for 20 or more different characters. 
For examp1e， the sound “ko" can stand for チ (child)ri (door)古(ancient)
去 (past)庫 (warehouse)柿I(solid)湖(1ake)倒(individua1)L!. (onese1f) 
故 (reason) 1芋(tosend for or invite) 拠 (foundation) 弧 (arc) 枯 (to
wither)， etc. In sum， there is lit1e c1ue in a sound of how that sound wi1 
100k on the page and the character on the page never stands for a sing1e 
sound. 
There is a .basic list compi1ed by the Ministry of Education of more than 
1850 characters which chi1dren are expected to have 1earned by the time 
they finish high schoo1. A very well-educated J apanese is expected to 
be ab1e to write 5000 and recognize severa1 thousand more. A good 
J apanese word processor contains 15，000 characters and a comp1ete mu1ti-
vo1ume encyc10pedia of Japanese inc1udes about 50，000 characters. A mark 
of a high1y educated man or woman in J apan is not on1y his or her ability to 
write many characters， but to write them beautifully. C 
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the same way that Americans take piano lessons. A poet's calligraphy is as 
important to his fame as his choice of words. Consider a line such as， for 
example，“When the strong wind blows， flowers fall." The manner in which 
the characters for strong， wind， and flower are drawn is very important to 
the creation of the poem. A Japanese poem exists on the page in the way 
that a Western poem does not. (Shakespeare's penmanship is not part of his 
poetry.) 
Although there are more characters in J apanese than any person can ever 
master， the characters are not sufficient to write even the simpliest spoken 
Japanese. Spoken Japanese is a highly inflected language with multiple verb 
endings and adjectives which conjugate as verbs do. These inflections are 
sounds which change the meanings of spoken words yet cannot be written in 
characters. Thus in addition to characters， any single page of written 
Japanese wi1l use symbols drawn from two separate syllabaries， katakana and 
hiragana， each completely adequate to the sounds of spoken Japanese. 
Katakana is used primarily for words of foreign origin ahd for einphasis， and 
hiragana is used for native J apanese words， verb and adjective endings， etc. . 
In writing a line of poetry about strong winds and flowers， it is possible to 
substitute symbols from one of the two phonetic syllabaries for a character. 
A poet might make choose hiragana if he wanted to lengthen and soften a 
part of the poem (characters are usually more vivid on the page than 
hiragana). Even in a riewspaper article， the choice of characters or hiragana 
or katakana affects the way the article hits the eye， although the spoken 
sound does not change if the article is read aloud. A transcription which 
altered these choices would not be regarded as a true copy of the article. 
The separation between writing and speaking is further accentuated by 
the fact that many common words in spoken J apanese are seldom used in 
written Japanese and vice versa. Spoken Japanese is also very different 
from place to place in Japan (similar to dialects in various parts ofEngland 
one hundred years ago). The written language is so different from spoken 
Japanese that it lacks the power to freeze the form of the spoken language， 
which changes rapidly from decade to decade.40 
In sum， Japanese tend to regard speaking and writing not as two 
40. 1 am grateful to Professor Shigeki Tanaka and to Keiko Koizumi for suggesting to m巴how
different writing and speaking are for the Japan巴se.The泳leof poetry discussed in the text was used 
by Keiko Koizumi to i1lustrate that po泊tto me. See Reischauer， supra note 16 at 380-400 for a 
brief description of the Japanese language. 
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different ways of expressing the same “words and sentences，" but as two 
very different ways of communicating. The Western merging of these two 
activities into the activity of “expressing oneself in a language" and then 
the merging of “expressing oneself in language A" and “expressing oneself 
in language B" into the idea of“expressing concepts and propositions" 
seems to the J apanese an extraordinary reification of ordinary acts of 
speaking and writing. 
The central place of theory in the West seems， from the Japanese per-
spective， to be a consequence of this extraordinary reification of ordinary 
acts of speaking and writing. A theory is a set of propositions. A true 
theory is made up of true propositions. The distinction between true 
propositions and false ones is based on some relationship between true 
propositions and reality. (The exact nature of that relationship has been a 
difficult problem for Western philosophy.) The verbal articulate man who 
asserts true propositions about rea1ity is the model of an educated Western 
man. The giants of Western science and philosophy are considered giants 
because they said what was true. The prophets of the Bible were celebrated 
because they expressed God's vision of the world. The scientists whom 
we esteem are like prophets in that they say what the world is 1ike from 
God's point of view， that is， they say what is true. The Western idea of 
truth is essentially dependent on the Western idea of an omniscient God. 
The true view ofthe world is the world from God's point of view. Prophets， 
scientists， and philosophers are valued to the degree that they have said 
what was “objectively" true， that is， have described the world from God's 
point ofview.41 
From the Japanese point of view， propositions and theories are the 
resu1ts of reifications. Because the J apanese never reified propositions， 
theories， or the rea1ity about which theories were said to be true， they 
have been comparatively uninterested in large-scale theorizing. What they 
have cared about is the appropriateness of the behavior of particular people 
in particular contexts. Sometimes the behavior involves speaking， but the 
Japanese do not attach as much importance to saying things as Westerners 
do to saying things. They believe that men and women think and feel many 
41. From the Japanese point of view， Dworkin is right that the issue of“objectivity" is a non. 
issue. Dworkin， A MATTER OF PRINCIPLE 167.177 (1985). Japanese academics sometimes have 
trouble understanding Dworkin's argument because the view that Dworkin is opposing makes no sense 
to them. 
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things that cannot be expressed in words. We Westemers， especially 
educated English speakers， tend to feel士hatour language is so rich and 
powerful that if we cannot express ourselves in it， it is our fault. With 
the examples of Shakespeare and Miltonbefore us， we tend to believe that 
the English language is adequate to express any thoughts or emotions we 
might have. 
In contrast， the J apanese regard themselves as larger than their language. 
Every J apanese person believes that his or her deepest thoughts and most 
powerful emotions are beyond the power of either speaking or writing 
to express. Often it may be only other behavior， such as a sigh， or the 
placement of f10wers in a vase， which can adequately express his or her 
thoughts and feelings. In such a case， the meaning of such behavior cannot 
be expressed in words. We in the West tend to believe that language defer-
mines thought. We believe that if the meaning of some human act cannot be 
put into words， then that act has no meaning or sense; it is literally non-
sensica1. We seem to believe ourselves to be trapped inside of our language.42 
From the Japanese point of view， itseems obvious that human beings 
experience much more than they understand and understand much more 
than they can articulate in speech or in writing. Both speaking and writing 
are actions no different from running or eating. “The meaning" in the 
Westem sense of what is said or written isonly one part and often not the 
most important part of acts of speaking or writing. 
The J apanese do not especially value the truthsayer. They do not value 
especially the sayer or the speaker at al. There is no bias as there is in 
the West for valuing the speaker because he might speak the truth. Children 
are not taught that voluntary speaking is an especially good thing.43 The 
articulate verbal personality is thought of by the J apanese as probably a 
bit shallow， because the deepest emotions cannot be expressed in mere 
42. See， e.g.， A. Hutchinson， From Cultural Construction to Historical Deconstruction， 94 
YALE LAW JOURNAL 209 at 236 (1984).“Languag巴isthe silen t po担ceof the mind. Moreover， we 
have only language to rely on to escape language." 
For the Japanese， this seems an odd thing to say. A language is not a set of goggles locked 
around our head through which we must look .at things; it is more similar to a musical instrument 
ready at hand that we can choose to play or not to play， although the language we choose to play 
(English or Japanese or Language X) willlimit the sounds we can make，. and the thoughts and emo-
tions we can express. Some thoughts and emotions cannot be expressed in any language. 
43. Three old Japanese proverbs are，“Silence is golden，"“All trouble comes from the mouth，" 
and“Words紅ethe root of al evil." When children in Japan try to justify their behavior with a verbal 
explanation， they are sometimes reprimanded with the phrase，“Rikutsu-o yuu-na，" which translates 
literally as“Don't talk about logic." Mizutani & Mizutani， NIHONGO NOTES 3 at 21 (1980). 
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words. Words， and speaking， and language are simply not valued the way 
they are in the West. 
From the Japanese point ofview， the Western obsession with speech， and 
with truth and true theory， often seem to get in the way of group harmony; 
such obsessions are ve巧rthreatening to the contextual self. One J apanese 
friend of mine， a phi1osophy professor， observed that the Japanese have 
litle interest in abstract theory because theories are most useful to people 
who like to argue. People who do not like to argue have no use for theory. 
Given al of the above， itis no wonder that the J apanese do not embrace 
the elaborate traditions of textual analysis and the complicated linguistic 
structures of Western law as the primary means of ordering Japanese society. 
Unlike many non.研 esterncountries， J apan has managed to preserve its 
traditional means of social ordering， especially the contextual sense of self， 
and so has not needed to rely as heavi1y on Western law and legal institu緋
tions. 
V 
We have seen that from the point of view of the Japanese， Western 
conceptions of the individual self and Western conceptions of language seem 
to be the result of the reification of religious ideas and aspects of the 
activities of speaking and writing. The appeal of Western law and legal 
institutions seems to rest on conceptions of the self and of language which 
the Japanese do not share. It is interesting that contemporary Western 
phi1osophers are now engaged in the task of dismant1ing the top-heavy 
theoretical structures which have characterized Western thought.44 
The dense network of social relationships which constitute J apanese 
society and the Japanese person seems a survival from mankind's past 
preserved by an extraordinary history of isolation into the modern age. 
Japanese society seems to bracket the history of the West， giving us a 
window into the past to a period before the extraordinary reifications of 
self and language that have dominated Western thought since Plato， and also 
a view of the future to show us what a modern industrial society which does 
not rely on those reifications might be like. 
Japanese generally prefer norト.verbalover verbal cornrnunication whenever possible. See Christopher， 
THE JAPANESE MIND (1983) at 41-42. 
44. See， e.g.， Rorty， Philosophy as a Kind o[ Writing: An Essay on Derrida CONSEQUENCES 
OF PRAGMATISM 90 (1982). See also supra notes 10 and 37. 
